Social issues in China
 |
Social issues in China are varied and wide-ranging, and are a combined result of the Chinese economic reforms set in place in the late 1970s, China's political and cultural history, and an immense population. Because of the vast number of social problems that exist in China today (not at all exclusive to the following list), China's government has faced considerable difficulty in trying to remedy the issues. Many of these issues are exposed by the Chinese media, while subjects that may contain politically sensitive issues may be censored. Some academics hold that China's fragile social balance, combined with abubble economy makes China an extremely unstable country, while others argue China's societal trends have created a balance to sustain itself.
Contents
[hide]Overview[edit]
According to Professor Jianrong, official statistics show the number of recorded incidents of mass unrest are "boiling ... to the point of explosion". They have risen from 8,709 in 1993 to more than 90,000 in each of 2007 through 2009. Reasons cited include an aggrieved class of dispossessed migrants and unemployed workers, a deep loss of faith in the system among many Chinese and a weakening in the traditional means of state control.[1]
Professor Hu Xingdou of the Beijing University of Technology said corruption, state monopolies, the yawning wealth gap and the rising cost of housing, education and medical care all contribute significantly to unrest. He said land seizures and the widening wealth gap were the two top factors: Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1979, the disparity between the urban and rural populations has risen from 2.56:1 in 1978 to 3.33:1 in 2009. Urban income in 1978 was 343 yuan whilst rural income stood at 134 yuan; in 2009, the corresponding figures were 17,175 yuan and 5,153 yuan respectively. Despite the overall increase in urban income, unemployment, unpaid wages and police misconduct are sources of grievances.[1]
Regional imbalances[edit]
- Rural-urban disparity and the wealth gap
Since the economic reforms in China began, income inequality has increased significantly. The Gini Coefficient, an income distribution gauge, has worsened from 0.3 back in 1986 to 0.42 in 2011,.[2] Poverty researchers recognize anything above 0.4 as potentially socially destabilizing.
The growing wealth gap can be seen as a byproduct of China’s economic and social development policies. The adverse effects of having a widening inequity between the rich and the poor include social and political instability, discrimination in access to areas such as public health, education, pensions and unequal opportunities for the Chinese people. It is important to note that the inequality in income in China can also be seen as a rural-urban income gap especially with the widely criticized social development policy, the Hukou (household registration) System in place. Market income – mainly wages – has been the driving factor in shaping urban income inequality since the economic reforms in China while the widening rural-urban income gap is due to low salaries for employees and migrants in many companies coupled with rapidly growing profits for the management of State-owned enterprises, real estate developers and some private companies. The urban per capita net income stood at 17,175 yuan ($2,525) in 2009, in contrast to 5,153 yuan in the countryside, with the urban-to-rural income ratio being 3.33:1, according to figures from the National Bureau of Statistics.[3]
The Hukou System has been long seen as an institutionalized source of inequality and disparity among the population and source of population control[4] seen a deterrence factor for rural citizens to seek a higher standard of living in the cities as rural citizens will be denied access to urban housing and education for their children. It is also seen as a legacy of the dualistic economy, serving as a highly effective measure of limiting urban migration.[5]
- Coastal-hinterland imbalance
- Digital divide
Population[edit]
- Overpopulation
- Male-female ratio disparity from sex-selective abortion and other problems associated from the One-child policy
- Aging of population due to one child policy
- Steady increase in cases of AIDS.
Employment[edit]
Employment distribution has been an important issue for the Chinese Government ever since it began initiating reforms.[6] Employment levels differs from region to region, with stronger concentrations of unemployment in the interior. That trend which has been stemmed in part from the efforts of the Chinese Government to make its SOEs (State Owned Enterprises), which had a redundancy rate at an estimated 25-30% in 1999,[7] more efficient.[8] on the other hand as of late 2011 the heavily industrialized coastal areas and cities are in fact experiencing an employment shortage due to the runaway growth of the economy.[9] Guangdong province alone needs at least 1 million workers to cover the shortage.[10]
Government and law[edit]
- Bloated staffing in civil service and redundant government agencies
- Corruption (nepotism and cronyism (favorism over meritocracy), wasting public funds, bribery, legal system corruption (司法制度腐败),Corporate scandals etc.)
- Face projects (面子工程), including building useless roads, buildings, and huge government squares
- Tofu-dreg projects (豆腐渣工程), meaning poorly built infrastructure
- government-commerce relationships (官商勾结)
- Lack of the rule of law
- Fusion and unclear definition on the powers of the government and judiciary
Crime[edit]
- Increase in corporate irregularity a.k.a. white-collar crime.
- Close tie between organized crime and corruption.[11]
- Extensive allegations of counterfeiting.
- Increased instances of alleged fraud and scams (including people claiming supernatural powers, quack medicines, etc.)
- The resurgence of Chinese organized crime.[12]
Social unrest[edit]
- Media censorship
- Dissatisfaction with corrupt government officials.
- Large protests against local government/businesses due to unfair treatment (usually land and expropriation related issues) and ensuing persecution.
Elitism and discrimination[edit]
- Regional elitism (mainly in Beijing and Shanghai)
- Discrimination against women
- Emergence of new class system
Education[edit]
- Common with other East Asian countries is the extreme pressure from friends, family, and society to perform well in extremely competitive schools, (especially in Gaokao, the university entrance exams) this can result in unethical behaviour performed by parents and/or students (bribery, cheating, etc. to get into best schools)[13]
- Rural-urban inequality
- Lack of strong relationship between state-funded research and the private sector, e.g. poor commercialization and technology transfer of university research
- Lack of critical scholarship and monitoring of research quality
Morality[edit]
- Norm that social competitiveness should be considered above all else
- Loss of traditional Confucianism morals and beliefs
- Inflexible ideologies taught in public
- Money worship
Loss of culture[edit]
As a result of the cultural revolution many traditional Chinese customs and beliefs have been lost, though some have been revived.[citation needed]
China’s Three Challenges in 2014
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – Since ascending to the Chinese Communist Party’s top post in November 2012, Xi Jinping has confounded observers. While his political strategy has entailed tightening the CCP’s control over ideology, cracking down on official corruption, repressing dissent, and championing a more nationalistic foreign policy, he has announced an unusually bold economic-reform blueprint.
The world will soon find out whether Xi’s politically conservative course is intended to facilitate his pro-market economic reforms. Having spent 2013 consolidating his position and formulating his agenda, this year Xi will have to begin delivering on his promises and demonstrating that he is as capable of applying power as he is at accumulating it. His success will depend on how he addresses three major challenges.
The first challenge confronting Xi in 2014 is undoubtedly implementation of his economic-reform package, which has aroused both excitement and skepticism since it was unveiled in mid-November. Optimists point to the package’s ambitious goals as evidence of Xi’s commitment to reform, while critics cite its vagueness and lack of a specific timetable as grounds for caution.
In order to prove the skeptics wrong, Xi must translate rhetoric into policy, and policies into concrete, measurable results. This means starting the new year by implementing reforms that require only administrative action, such as granting licenses to private banks, increasing competition by removing barriers to entry for private firms, liberalizing interest and exchange rates, and extending residency rights to migrant laborers in small cities and towns.
Xi will have to follow these measures with legislation that formalizes some of the most critical reforms. Here, land reform will be the most difficult issue. Xi’s agenda offers only vague promises of increased property rights for farmers, while recent government pronouncements indicate that the bureaucracy wants to restrict such rights. In this context, Xi must convince the public that he will not allow vested interests to block change.
The second major challenge that Xi faces in 2014 is sustaining his highly popular – and hugely risky – anti-corruption campaign. Given that Xi has ruled out mobilizing the Chinese public to support his reform plans, his only means of forcing the bureaucracy to comply with his agenda is the threat of corruption investigations and prosecutions.
But this strategy will be difficult to execute, owing not only to the vast scale of corruption, but also to its critical role in distributing rents among factions and interest groups. An anti-corruption campaign that targets a large number of Chinese officials is likely to result in alienation, discontent, and division among the ruling elites.
The real litmus test of Xi’s intentions will be whether his government prosecutes Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the CCP’s highest policymaking body. According to official reports, Xi’s anti-graft noose has been tightening around Zhou since the arrest of many of his former lieutenants.
But prosecuting even a retired member of the Politburo Standing Committee would break a long-standing taboo. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping, the post-Mao regime has worked hard to ensure the physical security of its top officials, thereby avoiding Mao’s mistake of turning internal power struggles into life-and-death contests in which nobody is safe. Thus, while ordinary Politburo members have been targeted in the past (three have been imprisoned), members of its Standing Committee have been off limits.
So now Xi faces a dilemma. If he abides by the unwritten rule against prosecuting even former Standing Committee members, he risks undermining the credibility of his anti-corruption campaign. But if he puts his former colleague in jail, he could undermine cohesion among China’s top leadership.
The third challenge that Xi faces is avoiding an unnecessary conflict with Japan. China’s recent announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone covering the disputed Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands in China), followed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, suggest that the bilateral relationship – already at its lowest point in 40 years – will continue to deteriorate.
Xi and his advisers should not succumb to the illusory belief that such a conflict would boost their standing with the Chinese public. Japan, with its US backing, would inflict a humiliating military defeat on China. With his political future depending on his ability to deliver on his reform promises, the last thing Xi needs is a foreign-policy distraction – let alone a disastrous military misadventure.
The stakes are high for Xi and China in 2014. That means the stakes are high for the rest of the world as well.
Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/minxin-pei-considers-the-main-economic--political--and-strategic-issues-facing-chinese-president-xi-jingping-this-year#1l2AEjlQvhtZIp4P.99
Please login or register to post a comment
JUENJUEN LEE
I am studying for a Master in Finance, but have a Macro question. What happens when the RMB becomes a hard currency, and the Chinese central banks starts to get rid of their dollar reserves? What would this action do to the U.S. economy? Will Chinese economy be affected in the long run? How will the world economy be affected in the short and long run?
SEAN MAC
"Xi and his advisers should not succumb to the illusory belief that such a conflict would boost their standing with the Chinese public. Japan, with its US backing, would inflict a humiliating military defeat on China. With his political future depending on his ability to deliver on his reform promises, the last thing Xi needs is a foreign-policy distraction – let alone a disastrous military misadventure."
I don't agree with above statement.
If examining the context, it was not up to Xi. Xi's recent action was in response to Japanese government's action. No leader of any country should avoid to act upon any unfriendly confrontation of another country in terms of the integrity of its land. If after Japanese government's aggressive attitude, Xi didn't show any assertiveness, then he has failed his responsibility as a leader. To not bow to the pressure of Japanese government with the aid of the US may be risky but it is an unavoidable and rightful response.
HARI NAIDU
I think you're misreading the tea leaves...
Xi rise to power and recent CCP decisions reflects pre-eminence of political support from PLA and CCP - otherwise he' d not be going on a war path against inside party corruption by top officials.
According to Mao, a long march starts with first step... Eradication of top level party corruption demonstrates XI power is already consolidated including his Military Command of PLA.
Shadow banking is next, according to People's Daily, because of its nefarious influence on money supply; it may be that GSAs are also involved because of state structure.
FEATURED
India’s Shinzo Abe
BRAHMA CHELLANEY assesses the likely impact of Narendra Modi's victory on his country's economic and foreign policies.
Inequality Disaster Prevention
ROBERT J. SHILLER praises Thomas Piketty's invaluable contribution to a debate that is far from over.
Where Is the Inequality Problem?
KENNETH ROGOFF says that Thomas Piketty is right about rich countries, but wrong about the world.