Sunday 31 August 2014

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2014 
      
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This map is very bad news for Vladimir Putin

With Russia escalating its military involvement in eastern Ukraine to its highest levels yet, reportedly sending as many as 1,200 troops plus 30 tanks across the border to bolster its separatist rebel proxies, it's worth looking at one way that Russia has paid for its Ukraine aggression: global opinion toward Russia is plummeting.

You can see how rapidly world opinion is turning against Moscow in this map from Pew's recent report on attitudes toward Russia.

Global popular opinion toward Russia as of July 2014 (data via Pew)

Global popular opinion toward Russia as of July 2014 (data via Pew)

The map shows the proportion of people in every surveyed country who say they hold a favorable view of Russia, as of early July. Red means fewer than half hold a favorable opinion, purple means about half, and blue means more than half.

As you can see, Russia is extremely unpopular in most of the world. That's most true in Europe, where its favorability rating is typically somewhere in the teens, but it's also very true in Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. There are some major implications in this map for Russia, its place in the world, and the long-term consequences of its involvement in Ukraine.

Europeans are increasingly hostile toward Russia — as is almost everyone else

Vladimir Putin has to know tough times are coming (IVAN SEKRETAREV/AFP/Getty)

Vladimir Putin has to know tough times are coming. (IVAN SEKRETAREV/AFP/Getty)

Russia is most unpopular in Poland, which, as a long-suffering Soviet puppet state, is exceptionally alarmed about Russia's recent invasion of Crimea and its sponsorship of separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine. In Poland, only 12 percent say they have a favorable view of Russia, with 81 percent holding an unfavorable view. The rates are not much higher in the rest of Europe, which is part of why European leaders are becoming much more willing to impose tough sanctions on Russia, even at some cost to European economies.

But Russia is also deeply unpopular in the Middle East. This is most true in Turkey, where only 16 percent hold a favorable view of the country, with 73 percent holding an unfavorable view. This may be a result of Russia's sponsorship of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, who has been able to get away with slaughtering thousands of civilians in that country's civil war in part because Moscow shields him from international action.

Russia is not universally reviled. It has an astounding 75 percent approval rating in Vietnam, which may be in large part due to Russia's long-standing support for the Vietnamese communist government against the country's historical enemy, China. Russian support for Vietnam as a balance against China has been rising in recent years as well. China and Greece also report mostly favorable views toward Russia (66 and 61 percent), perhaps because they see Moscow as challenging the West, which is viewed with deep distrust in both countries.

The highest pro-Russia approval rating in Europe, outside of Greece, is actually Ukraine itself: 35 percent approval. This might seem bizarre, given that Russia is loathed globally for invading and annexing Ukraine, but remember that a source of the crisis from the beginning has been a political split between Ukraine's Europe-leaning western half and an eastern half that has more Russian speakers, more ethnic Russians, and a fonder memory of joint Ukraine-Russian history. Those eastern Ukrainians still exist, and some of them apparently approve of Russia's actions.

Russia has always been generally unpopular, but it's getting much worse

Global popular opinion toward Russia as of July 2013 (data via Pew)

Global popular opinion toward Russia as of July 2013 (data via Pew)

Russia's global unpopularity is not new, but that unpopularity has been on the rise since the Ukraine crisis began late in 2013, and it has been rising very rapidly. To see how quickly this has happened, above is a map showing the result of the same Pew poll one year earlier, in July 2013.

There's still plenty of red, but you may notice that the red is much lighter. Just one year ago when this poll was taken, Russia's favorability ratings in Europe were about twice what they are now: Poland dropped from 36 to 12 percent favorable toward Russia, Germany from 32 to 19, and Spain from 38 to 18. In the US, it plummeted from 37 to 19 percent.

Public opinion toward Russia soured in almost every country surveyed, across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. But it rose significantly in China, from 49 to 66 percent, again perhaps because of support for Russia's anti-Western confrontationalism. It also ticked up in Israel and the Palestinian territories, perhaps as a reaction against the US for brokering the failed and widely unpopular peace talks, as well as in India and the Philippines.

This is a major problem for Putin

Shoppers in Moscow peruse Vladimir Putin t-shirts (Marina Volisievitch/Laski Diffusion/Getty)

Shoppers in Moscow peruse Vladimir Putin t-shirts (Marina Volisievitch/Laski Diffusion/Getty)

These polls bear out, as President Obama has long argued, that Russia's role in the Ukraine crisis will eventually come back to hurt it, that Russian President Vladimir Putin will hang himself by his own rope. The more Russia imposes itself in Ukraine, the weaker it becomes everywhere else in the world.

The most direct cause of that is sanctions: European sanctions, which have gotten a good deal tougher since this poll was taken, are starting to really damage the Russian economy. Putin for years premised his rule, which has long been authoritarian, on delivering solid economic growth. Now that that growth is gone, he's using Ukraine to churn up nationalism instead; you see it working in this poll, which shows that Russians' views of their own country have gone from 83 percent favorable to 92 percent.

But Putin can only nibble away at Ukraine for so long. At some point, as the Ukrainian military pushes harder to finally defeat the pro-Russia rebels, Moscow will either get sucked into a full-blown quagmire or will quietly withdraw. Either way, the crisis will end, the nationalistic rallies will wind down in Russia, and Russians will wake up to realize that they've become poorer, internationally isolated, and even weaker than they were in the disastrous 1990s.

Thursday 14 August 2014

Computer hackers of the world this your enemy attack

Rupert Murdoch Scandal

There are many reasons the scandal engulfing Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. has riveted public attention around the world. It's a story that features all of the classic elements: crimes, betrayal, abuse of power and even a cover-up.

But beneath Murdoch's public meltdown lies a bigger problem, and it’s not confined to England, where News Corp. stands accused of hacking phones and computers and bribing and misleading investigators. It’s a problem that plagues all consolidated news organizations that reach a certain scale, but especially News Corp. It’s about what happens when media corporations get too cozy with power — and government officials fail to challenge them.

More than any of the current crop of media moguls, Murdoch accrues political influence through his aggressive manipulation of News Corp.'s many media outlets. It's not just in the way Murdoch’s media properties cover the news but how they use this coverage to give him favorable access to elected officials to promote News Corp.’s agenda.

The company uses its media power to shape corporate-friendly policies and quash those that don’t further its aims. News Corp. also helps elect politicians with timely endorsements while punishing foes who get in its way with negative coverage and political threats.

This relentless pursuit of power has worked in the United States, where neither the Federal Communications Commission nor Congress has mustered the courage to challenge runaway media consolidation or call Murdoch to account. Free Press has asked the FCC to assess the company’s fitness to continue holding 27 television broadcast licenses in light of the widening scandal, and continues to urge Congress to conduct hearings into the allegations of News Corp.’s “rampant law breaking.”

Earlier this year, in response to a call from Free Press and allied organizations, the Justice Department launched a probe of News Corp. It’s time for Congress and the FCC to step forward as well.

Saturday 9 August 2014


Russian billionaire Alexander Lebedev — currently the 564th richest person on Earth — made the news in September 2011 when he used his KGB-acquired combat skills to punch fellow tycoon Sergei Polonsky out of his chair on a live Russian TV program. But how many other former Soviet secret police agents are there who could be listed in Forbes — or who at the very least earn big bucks in the capitalist economy despite their communist past? We list 10 former KGB men who are now staggeringly wealthy.

10. Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Putin’s reported wealth only amounts to around $150,000 in savings and an income of about $80,000 per year, but a number of former Russian government officials have asserted that this is only the tip of the iceberg. Former Chairman of the Russian State Duma Ivan Rybkin and political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky have both claimed that the Russian Prime Minister secretly controls hefty stakes in gas and oil companies such as Gazprom and Gunvor — to the value of over $50 billion, according to Belkovsky, which would make him Europe’s richest man. In 2010, a former business associate of Putin named Sergei Kolesnikov claimed in a letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that Putin was involved in a scheme to siphon off donations to a health infrastructure project into his own personal funds. If either is true, clearly the former intelligence man has done well for himself in the world — albeit in the sneakiest of ways.

9. Alexei Kondaurov

Alexei Kondaurov was a former head analyst at Yukos — a company which provided 20 percent of Russia’s oil production before being driven to bankruptcy in 2006 — and is currently a member of Russia’s State Duma for the Communist Party. The ex-KGB general is irreverent about the conflict between his political ideology and his wealth, illustrated by his quote on being both a millionaire and a communist: “There’s no contradiction,” he said. “Engels was an oligarch and Lenin hardly a vagabond.”

8. Andrei Lugovoi

Millionaire businessman, politician and former KGB bodyguard Andrei Lugovoi is now more famous for his scandals than his wealth. Apart from being arrested in 2001 for helping to arrange the escape of Nikolai Glushkov, who was being detained on fraud charges, he is currently wanted in the UK in connection with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko. Lugovoi is suspected of poisoning the Russian defector with radioactive polonium-210 during a visit to the UK in 2006, after traces of the material were found in three of the hotels in which he stayed. However, he is highly unlikely to be extradited since, as a member of the State Duma, he has immunity to prosecution, and the backlash from the Russian public has even helped his political career. Lucky for some.

7. Philipp Bobkov

Philipp Bobkov was a key player in the KGB during the 1980s and 90s, one who was instrumental in creating Soviet front organizations and resolving ethnic conflicts in the Soviet Union (and by “resolving” we mostly mean “inciting them and then taking credit for stopping them, by brutally suppressing the local population”). He apparently quietened down in his old age, going on to work as the head of a prominent private security agency for the Media-Most company — an agency containing thousands of ex-KGB members. Media-Most was founded by Russian media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, so while we haven’t got a figure on Bobkov’s earnings there, for being in charge of so many men we’d wager they were pretty healthy. As a footnote, since said agency was accused of attempting to assassinate the oligarch Boris Berezovsky in 1994, Bobkov may not have given up on his dirty tricks just yet.

6. Andrey Belyaninov

This former KGB man has had a varied career, moving from serving with the international branch of the Russian intelligence service, to working as a financial expert at the (now defunct) REA bank, to heading the management board at Novikombank. The veteran finance expert then went on to serve as Director General at the state’s arms imports and exports agency Rosoboronexport (which had an export sales of $8.8 billion in 2009, incidentally) and is currently the chief of the Federal Customs Service of Russia. And they say that government employees don’t have to be smart… It’s a wonder Andrey Belyaninov didn’t give up intelligence work sooner.

5. Sergey Chemezov

The man with a monopoly on weapons in Russia was once an undercover KGB agent working in a company in Dresden, in the former East Germany, where his neighbor was a then-obscure fellow agent called Vladimir Putin. Chemezov now holds high-ranking positions in a number of companies, including a post on the board of directors at aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi (whose total assets reached $859.826 million in 2009). He is also the Director General at Rosoboronexport, the state-owned company which produces 90 percent of Russia’s annual weapons exports. Guess it’s not what you know, but who you know.

4. Nikolay Tokarev

Nikolay Tokarev was alleged to be a KGB officer in East Germany during the Cold War — another who reportedly befriended one Vladimir Putin in his younger years — but he has since transferred from the backstabbing world of espionage to the backstabbing world of international oil transportation. He is currently the president of the Russian state-owned company Transneft, an oil and gas logistics organization with over 100,000 employees and an income of $4 billion per year. Tokarev also previously tried his hand in another part of the state sector as president of Zarubezhneft, also a company involved with oil transportation. Not too shabby.

3. Viktor Ivanenko

Viktor Ivanenko was the former chairman of the KGB for the Russian Republic but, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1993 he moved to become the vice president of the petroleum company Yukos. He became a majority shareholder five years later, but soon resigned to work as an adviser to the Russian tax minister and later served as the vice president of the Development of Parliamentarianism in Russia foundation (whatever that is). In light of Ivanenko’s current net worth of $290 million, making him Russia’s 84th richest man at one point, some might say capitalism is better for the economy than the communism practiced during the time of the KGB — if you’re as high up in the business world as he is, anyway.

2. Alexander Bortnikov

Now a board member at Sovcomflot, one of the largest Russian state-owned maritime companies, Alexander Bortnikov is a former KGB officer done good (in a way). Bortnikov was trained in Moscow, then worked with the intelligence organization before becoming the chief of the St Petersburg/Leningrad Region Federal Security Service (FSB) and later getting promoted to become first Deputy Director and then Director of the FSB. Rumor has it that he and other high-up members in the agency were involved in the plot to murder Alexander Litvinenko in 2006; then, in 2007, he was reported to have been implicated in a money laundering scandal connected with the murder of Central Bank first deputy chairman Andrey Kozlov. Managing a big organization might occasionally mean having to get your hands dirty, but that’s taking it too far.

1. Alexander Lebedev

It bears repeating: Alexander Lebedev, multi-billionaire banking and media tycoon, punched a fellow billionaire on a live TV program. In recent years Lebedev has acquired a number of major British papers for sums of around £1, and he shows as much acumen in the world of fisticuffs as he does in business. The oligarch formerly worked for the First Chief Directorate of the KGB for the better part of a decade, the Directorate being the body that was responsible for foreign operations and intelligence gathering. Judging by the fact that Sergei Polonsky (the man he hit) was knocked practically across the room with one blow, all that training must have paid off for the man estimated to now be worth $2 billion.

Monday 4 August 2014

The Coming Collapse of China

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In a remarkably short period of time, China has become a world-class manufacturing powerhouse.

Tiananmen Square. Photo: Peter Morgan

Not surprisingly, China’s impressive economic growth of 9.5% annually, its widespread economic investments around the world, and its rapid ascent to global power, have caused concern in the western world, especially in the United States. China’s growing appetite for non-renewable resources, and its efforts to achieve global hegemony has added to this anxiety. History demonstrates that when a new great power emerges, uncertainty and conflict follow, because the rise of this new player challenges the status quo. China’s recent successes and its entry onto the global stage have convinced many historians and scholars of international relations – Martin Jacques and Niall Ferguson to name two – that China will inevitably become a global hegemon. I believe it is naive to think that there will be such a thing as a global hegemon. No country or great power can completely dominate the world today. However, the closest a country can come to global hegemony is through regional hegemony.

The United States is supposed to be the world’s superpower not because it is dominating the entire world, but because of its complete domination of the western hemisphere. As of now, it has no political, military, or economic rival in its region. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that China will not dominate the twenty first century. Nor will it become the hegemon – the political, military, and economic leader – of its region. I maintain that China, after the slow-down of its economic growth, will began to recede and thus play a much more diminished role on the global scene. China’s history demonstrates that the country is a regional hegemon when it is internally stable. When internally unstable, the country is in no position to project its power effectively abroad. One of the major problems the country is currently faced with is Uyghur nationalism and their independence movement.

China’s ability to maintain its economic growth is also in question, and the failure of China’s government to do so would be colossal. Social unrest and political chaos are already looming over China. Even a small political crisis will do serious damage to China’s economic growth. In a recent op-ed article in National Interest, Jonathan Levine raises a critical topic: “Why Reform Eludes China.” Levine’s response is revealing: “The importance of mature institutions in ensuring stable growth is nowhere more visibly on display now than in China, where their failings arguably pose the single greatest challenge for the ruling Communist Party.” China is a fragile power because it has challenges the communist leadership cannot overcome. Unlike western democracies, it is not success in the next election that keeps Chinese leaders awake at night but anxieties about social unrest that could potentially bring down the communist regime.

In addition, China is located on a continent with many regional economic powerhouses – India, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea. These countries, as Fareed Zakaria points out, harbor deep historical mistrust and suspicion towards one another. As China attempts to become the dominant power, these countries will unite in response to China’s growing influence in their backyards. As John Mearsheimer argues in the Tragedy of Great Power Politics, no country can assert the status of the great power in the world, unless it has dominated its own continent first.

Mearsheimer’s theory of international relations, termed “offensive realism,” is based on the inherent fears for survival that arise in the anarchic international system. “Survival is a state’s most important goal, because a state cannot pursue any other goals if it does not survive.” The basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. However, Mearsheimer writes, “Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival.” It is only through expansion and accumulation of power that a great power can assure its survival.

Can China become the hegemon in its region in the face of these major problems? It will be very trying for the Chinese government to sustain its economic growth and project its power in an effective way in its region. China is plagued with colossal problems ranging from regional power play to a growing middle class who demand political participation. Tackling these issues will be a major challenge for the Chinese Communist Party and there is no reason to worry that China will dominate the world any time soon. For upon closer examination the prospects of the Middle Kingdom achieving global hegemony are not as high as it is thought.

This article was originally published in the Washington University Political Review.